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Both research and public debate on immigration in Europe are currently focused on Third 
Country Nationals – their numbers, rights, migration projects, and relations with host 
societies. While this focus is more than legitimate, as immigration from outside the EU 
boundaries is a potentially revolutionary force in demographic and cultural terms, little 
attention is devoted to European citizens moving inside Europe. Since they cross state 
borders to relocate abroad, these individuals are to be classified as ‘migrants’. However, 
thanks to European integration, they enjoy a quite extraordinary status among world 
migrants, inasmuch as they preserve a set of political and social prerogatives that are usually 
precluded to foreigners. EU regulations safeguard them from discrimination in almost any 
realm of activity. They can move, settle, return, and participate in the social, economic, and 
political spheres of host countries on an equal footing with citizens of such countries. Their 
life chances are denationalized, possibly as the only real avant–garde of those cosmopolitan 
migrants protected by human rights and international law that some scholars expect to 
emerge with the advent of the post–modern age (e.g., Soysal 1994). 
 
This paper sets out to illustrate the institutional underpinnings and the socio–demographic 
outlook of intra–EU migrations on the eve of the 21st century. It starts by briefly 
recapitulating, rapidly but necessarily, the historical roots of migration in Europe in the 
industrial age (§ 2). Such traditional population flows form the social backdrop of the early 
free movement policies of the European Communities in the 1950s and 1960s (§ 3). 
Paradoxically, the deepening of free movement policies in the following decades coincided 
with the shrinkage of continental migration. However, once the Maastricht Treaty had 




redefined free movement as the cornerstone of European citizenship, migrations across the 
EU seem to have been moderately on the rise (§ 4). In recent times, new and old mobility 
tracks intertwine and overlap, in a scenario of growing individualization and volatility of 
residential and work choices. The paper ends by reviewing some hypotheses about the 
social and political impact of intra–continental migration (§ 5), as a basis for further 
investigation and a more grounded assessment of free movement in the process of European 
integration. 
 
2. A Continent of Migrants: Population Movements in Europe in the 
Industrial Age 
Until some thirty years ago, Europeans used to be migrants. The option to expatriate 
appeared to many families and local communities as an extremely plausible and socially 
respectable life choice. As senders, receivers or both, all countries have been somewhat 
familiar with migration experiences. Any social history of Europe would be highly deficient 
were it to overlook movements of populations: ‘Migration was a long–standing part of the 
family, land–holding, and inheritance systems of the continent’ (Moch 1996: 7).  
 
With a few exceptions (most noticeably France), no European nation has been exempted, at 
different times of its history, from sending a noticeable share of its younger population 
outside its borders. In the 1824–1924 period 52 million  people were shipped from 
European ports to North and South America, Australia and New Zealand. About three 
quarters of them are likely to have stayed indefinitely out of their home country (Moch 
1996: 124)1. The United States took in 60–70 percent of European migrants, while Canada, 
Argentina and Brazil received 7–15 percent each (Nugent 1996: 79). The apex of 
transatlantic flows was reached between 1911 and 1915 and again in the early 1920s, when 
about one million and a half Europeans crossed the Ocean (Bade 2000: 143). However, 
European migrants of the late 19th and early 20th century had many possible destinations. If 
between 1851 and 1890 three quarters of them went to the USA, in later decades the 
proportion sank to about half (Bade 2000: 137)2. Movements to colonies and other European 
countries appear to have grown in the new century. The latter, in particular, were almost as 
large as migrations out of the continent; for instance, 44% of all Italian emigrants from 1871 
to 1914 left for another European country (Bade 2000: 162).  
 
The 1929 recession and the rise of Fascist and Nazi regimes halted these population flows, 
which nonetheless reemerged soon after World War II. In the 1950s, Europe lost 2.7 
millions residents who mainly followed the transatlantic migration tracks beaten by 
European migrants about one generation earlier (Bade 2000: 301–302). In the 1960s, 
however, movements to the Americas dropped. Intra–continental migrations replaced them 
                                              
1 Slightly different figures can be found in Bade (2000: 141–142), while a critical assessment of all 
calculations of historical migration flows is provided by Nugent (1996: 78–79). The most serious estimation 
problem has to do with commuters, as improvement in transport technologies, by lowering the costs of 
travel, progressively boosted the proportion of ‘rotation’ or ’seasonal’ migrants also among long–distance 
travelers. 
2 However, ‘America’ epitomized any migration country (Hoerder 1996: 220–221). In Italy, for example, the 
‘American uncle’ represented the popular image of the successful relative abroad regardless of the place 
where the migrant had actually settled. 
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(figure 1). In an age of reconstruction and economic expansion, Central–Northern European 
industrial areas attracted migrant workers within and between countries.  
 
As King (1993: 23) summarizes,  
 
the established model of mass Mediterranean migration to North European cities was that migrants were 
required for the lowest–status and most poorly–paid jobs which, in a tight labour market characterized by 
rising standards of education and thus employment aspirations, were shunned by the local work–force. 
Construction, factory employment and low–grade service occupations were typical employment sectors into 
which migrants were channeled. 
 
 
Figure 1. Switching to Europe: proportion of emigration flows from Southern European 

















Source: Livi Bacci (1972: 114) 
 
 
The bulk of intra–European migrants left rural and mountainous areas of Southern Italy, 
Western Spain, Northern Portugal and Northern Greece. Italians moved first, already in the 
1950s, Spaniards soon followed3, while the ranks of the moving Portuguese and Greeks 
swelled since the mid–1960s. The Portuguese presence in France, in particular, skyrocketed 
in the 1960s: from 50,000 at the beginning of the decade to more than 800,000 ten years 
later (Moch 1992: 185); many of them settled in miserable favelas on the outskirts of Paris, 
to be soon absorbed in French society. Generally speaking, in the 1946–1970 period Italy 
was the most common country of origin and West Germany the most common destination 
of all these flows. On the one hand, 1,520,000 Italians settled in another European country – 
more than 80% of them in Germany and Switzerland (Pugliese 2002: 21–22)4. On the other 
                                              
3 Spanish international migration soared in 1960, as a consequence of the economic shock caused by 
Franco’s Plan de estabilización y liberalización of 1959 (Ródenas Calatayud 1994: 63 ff.). Moreover, in 
1960 a labor recruitment agreement was signed with Germany, channeling Spanish migrants to the strongest 
market for ‘guest’ work in Europe. 
4 This figure amounts to net migration, that is the difference between four and a half million departures and 
three million returners. 




hand, at its highest level, in the early 1970s, in Western Germany there were about 
1,500,000 ‘guests’ from Mediterranean Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) (Rogers 
1985: 5–9).  
 
More than the direct cause, the oil shock of 1973 was the occasion to put a halt to mass 
migration within Europe. Signs of growing xenophobia, linked to the awareness of an 
incumbent economic crisis, had driven Britain (in 1962 and 1968), Switzerland (in 1970) 
and Sweden (in 1972) to tighten their immigration policies already before the Kippur war. 
While repatriation schemes failed and family reunification never stopped, in the early 1970s 
mass labour migration to Europe and within Europe came to an end. Thereafter, the size of 
movements between European countries declined, destinations diversified, and migration 
projects became more individualized.  
 
3. From Migrants to Movers: European Integration and Free Movement 
Policies 
Given the backdrop of existing migration flows, free movement across member countries 
was one of the chief goals of European integration from its early days. Indeed, it was first 
introduced by the pioneer supranational organization of shared economic interests, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (formed in 1951), to ease specialized workforce 
recruitment across national borders. Among the six founding States of the Community 
(Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy), Italy was particularly 
keen to support this goal, as a way to lower domestic unemployment and underemployment, 
as well as to improve the living conditions of nationals who had already migrated abroad 
(cf. Willis 1971: 150; Ascoli 1979: 29–36; Dumoulin 1989; Romero 1991: 29–34; Maas 
2003).  
 
While the ECSC Treaty limited it to ‘workers who are nationals of Member States and have 
recognized qualifications in a coalmining or steelmaking occupation’ (article 69), the right 
of free movement was formalized in the founding Treaty of the European Economic 
Community signed in Rome in 1957. Basically, article 48 of this Treaty affirmed the right to 
accept offers of employment made in another Member State, to move freely within the 
Community, as well as to reside and remain in another Member State after having been 
employed. In its original version, however, the Treaty tied the right to move to the creation 
of job commitments, as it explicitly referred to ‘workers’ rather than ‘citizens’. At this 
stage, Community law openly treated migrants as production factors rather than persons tout 
court, in line with the functionalist conception of European integration as an essentially 
economic enterprise. While bilateral agreements between national governments had been 
established soon after World War II, and extended later to more peripheral countries 
(Germany and Portugal signed one in 1964, and Germany and Yugoslavia in 1968) (Salt 
1976; Werner 1976), the EEC Treaty built a more solid legal framework around the intra–
European mass migration system of its age, taking into account that free movement met the 
interests of both would–be foreign workers in Italy and potential employers in Germany, 
Benelux and France.  
 
However, the implementation of free movement proceeded at a slow and discontinuous 
pace. For more than a decade, in spite of the Rome Treaty, citizens of EEC Member States 
who intended to work in a different Member State continued to be submitted to national 
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immigration laws just like Third Country Nationals. They had to apply for work and 
residence permits, which could be denied by discretionary ruling. According to article 49 of 
the Treaty, free movement was a fully intergovernmental policy left to decisions taken in 
the Council of Ministers. Central and Northern European EEC Member States resisted the 
interference of supranational regulations with their sovereign power to control aliens. More 
specifically, in these countries it was often argued that free movement would have given 
some competitive advantage to Italians over other Southern European migrants, possibly 
making them less controllable and stable workers5. 
 
The real implementation of free movement was thus postponed to 1968, when Council 
Regulation 1612/68 and Council Directive 68/360 abolished movement and residence 
restrictions of Member State workers and their family in the entire EEC territory. On the 
one hand, Regulation 1612/68 forbade all nationality–based discrimination between workers 
of Member States in terms of work conditions, salary, and unemployment benefits. 
Furthermore, it established the foreign workers’ right to the same social and tax benefits as 
national workers, including access to training in vocational schools and existing housing 
benefits. Family members of foreign workers (including TCN spouses) were entitled to 
reside with them and to be allowed access to any kind of employment in the host country. 
On the other hand, Directive 68/360 reduced the bureaucratic formalities of moving within 
the EU considerably, recognizing the workers’ and their families’ rights to enter a different 
Member State by simply showing an identity card or valid passport, without being forced to 
obtain a visa. Communitarian migrants were also entitled to a ‘residence permit’, with a 
validity of at least five years and an automatic renewal, by presenting an employment 
certificate. In addition, permanence in the host country was guaranteed thereafter, as the 
residence permit could not be withdrawn in case of involuntarily unemployment and its lack 
could not justify expulsion. 
 
The 1968 provisions ended the transitional regime set by article 49 of the Treaty, and 
created the conditions for a full exercise of the free movement right. They indeed represent 
a turning point in this matter. In the following decades, up to the present, admission, 
residence and equal treatment of foreign residents from other Member States have been 
dealt with through a raft of secondary legislation. Community law and the European Court 
of Justice have increasingly spread the matter and scope of the right to free movement 
originally contained in the Treaty. In particular, since the 1970s the ECJ has played a 
fundamental role in widening the scope of free movement by shifting its focus progressively 
from the free movement of workers to the free movement of persons. Due to the 
contribution of European citizens submitting their cases, the Court was able to give a 
broader interpretation of article 39 (ex 48) of the Treaty and of the Regulation 1612/68, 
emphasizing the social and individual dimension of free movement. According to the ECJ, 
the right to equal treatment implies fully–fledged integration, not only in the job market, but 
in the whole society, including social, cultural, and educational aspects of workers’ and their 
families’ lives (O’Keeffe 1998: 20–25). With the decisive contribution of ECJ 
                                              
5 It is true that free circulation norms brought migrants from EEC Member States (basically, Italians) out of 
those official employment channels by which 84% of Spanish and 86% of Portuguese, but only 8% of Italian 
workers, were hired in Germany in 1969 (Romero 2001: 413). However, even before the full enactment of 
free movement rights, the popularity of commuting between Italy and other EEC countries had been very 
high in the post–World War II period (Corti 2003: 93). 




jurisprudence, in the 1970s laws on free movement were extended to self–employed 
workers and in the 1980s to persons who take up a paid apprenticeship, who enter university 
in a Member State different from their own after having taken up a job activity, and who are 
employed as seasonal workers (Baldoni 2003: 8–9)6.  
 
As a logical consequence of the Single European Act of 1986, aimed at creating an ‘area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured’, a significant step forward in the history of the extension of free 
movement rights was made in 1990, when the freedom of movement and residence was 
explicitly extended to not economically active categories (as well as their families): 
students, pensioners and the unemployed (i.e., a residual category encompassing all those 
who do not enjoy freedom of intra–European movement on other grounds)7. Still, such 
arrangements are subject to two conditions from which workers are exempted: students, 
pensioners, and the unemployed must have health insurance and sufficient resources to 
avoid becoming a burden on the national health systems and social assistance of the host 
Member State. 
 
Symbolically, however, the most spectacular step in the process took place with the Treaty 
on the European Union, signed in Maastricht in 1992 and entering into force on the 1st of 
November 1993. The Maastricht Treaty introduces the citizenship of the European Union to 
‘reinforce the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States’. 
Concretely, EU citizenship consists of a set of rights allowing to: a) vote and stand as 
candidates in elections of the European Parliament and in municipal elections in the 
Member State in which individuals reside, regardless of their nationality; b) submit petitions 
to the European Parliament and appeal to the EU ombudsman; c) be protected by the 
consular authorities of another Member State in third countries that lack diplomatic 
representation of one’s State; d) move and reside freely on the territory of any of the EU 
Member States. 
 
Needless to say, the first three rights have a small scope compared to the last. For the 
ordinary EU citizen, access to diplomatic protection in third countries is an extremely 
unusual event; petitions to the EP or the ombudsman look like quite remote options; and the 
EP vote has little political relevance, suffering from higher abstention rates than all other 
elections in Europe (this is admittedly less the case for local elections). Indeed, the exercise 
of voting rights for the EP and local governments regardless of the country of residence is a 
second–order right requiring the exercise of the right to free residence abroad first. Thus, the 
rights to free movement and settlement in the entire EU territory form the cornerstone of EU 
citizenship. And this is exactly what many Europeans perceive that the EU is for: When 
questioned about the ‘meaning of the European Union’, young EU citizens point 
predominantly to ‘the ability to go wherever I want’ (39% of respondents in 2001, 35% in 
1997) (Eurobarometer 2001: 16).  
 
                                              
6 Yet, the controversial position of posted workers (i.e., workers who are temporarily sent to another 
Member State to perform services there and who return to their country of origin after completion of their 
work) was clarified only twenty years later, with the Council Directive 96/71.  
7 The legal bases of these changes are to be found in Directives 90/364, 90/365, 90/366 (the latter was then 
replaced by Directive 93/96). 
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To sum up, the free movement of persons across national borders – evoked as a long–term 
aim in the early years of the European integration process – has turned into a real possibility 
in the EU by the end of the 20th century. The two major legal steps in this process were the 
abolition of restrictions on movement and residence for workers of Member States and their 
families in 1968, and the introduction of EU citizenship in 1992. Another practical 
advancement was the adoption of the Schengen system, which took place progressively in 
the 1990s, to eliminate passport controls between EU national borders. Not less important, 
albeit less visible, was the action of the European Court of Justice. The ECJ promoted free 
movement significantly and progressively through its judgments, in particular by extending 
and reinforcing the rights of workers in host countries and fighting discrimination based on 
nationality. Especially at times when community legislation on the matter hung in the 
balance, the Court stood as a bulwark against all attempts to maintain privileges rooted in 
pre–existing or re–emerging nationality–based pieces of legislation. Even semantically, all 
these changes have turned intra–community ‘migrant workers’, as they were called in the 
ECSC Treaty of 1951, to ‘movers’, as they are now usually referred to in EU documents. 
 
4. Migrating as Citizens: An Overview of Intra–EU Movements after the 
Maastricht Treaty 
European Community regulation on free circulation began to be effective in the late 1960s, 
just when the interest to migrate from Southern to Northern Europe sank. Economic growth 
in sending countries discouraged migration. Free movement laws certainly removed the 
prior constraints to settling abroad, but in years of substantial weakening of both demand 
and supply of alien workforce (figure 2). Foreign workers from the European Community of 
Nine shrank from 1.8 to 1.2 millions in the 1973–1985 period (Molle and Van Mourik 1988: 
326). Outflows from Italy, which were expected to be fuelled by Community legislation, 
declined steadily from 1961 onwards. Greeks could not exploit free movement opportunities 
until 1988, seven years after their country joined the European Community, while Spaniards 
and Portuguese had to wait until 1992, when the moratorium period for the extension of free 
movement rights to Spanish and Portuguese citizens ended. Even in these cases, the 
generalization of the rights to move, settle and work abroad in Western Europe did not 
revive the traditional sources of European migration. In economists’ language, ‘the stock of 
foreign residents from the Southern EU members had already reached its equilibrium level 
when the free movement was introduced’ (Boeri and Brücker 2001: 12). 
8 AMID Working Paper Series 
 
 
Figure 2. Rise and fall of post–World War II European migration: intra–continental yearly 




























Sources: Golini and Amato (2001, 50); Pugliese (2002: 56);  Istat (various years); Ródenas Calatayud (1994: 261 and 
267); Baganha (2002: 19) 
 
Is this still a valid picture? Although the introduction of EU citizenship did not prompt a 
renewed tide of intra–European migration, it probably changed its profile and character. In 
particular, in the absence of border controls, visa, and sanctions for non–registration, 
Europeans are entitled to move back and forth between home and host countries at their 
own will and pace. Free movement is thus likely to have fostered short–term, commuting 
and rotation mobility, at the expense of permanent settlement abroad. These are definitely 
more ‘invisible’ movements, which further complicate the already difficult task of 
assembling migration data that differ from one EU Member State to another because of 
discrepancies in the sources and methods of collecting statistics (Poulain 1996 and 1999)8.  
                                              
8 In this section we concentrate on stocks of migrants, as comparative data on migration flows in the EU are 
much less complete. On the entire migrant population (i.e., workers and non–workers), sufficient time series 
are available only for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden (Recchi 
et al. 2003). During the 1990s, the inflow of EU citizens in all of these countries tended to either rise slightly 
or remain constant. Eurostat indicates that ‘over the second half of the 1990s, an average of only just over 
one in 1,000 of those resident in the EU moved from one Member State to another each year’ (Thorogood 
and Winqvist 2003: 2). Among workers only, EU citizens made up 19% of the entire immigration flows into 
EU Member States in the 1995–2000 period (Bailly et al. 2004: 39). Significantly, 10% of them did not 
move away from their own country – that is, they were ‘global movers’ with other migration experiences as a 
background (ibidem). This was most often the case for EU citizens settling in peripheral Member States, 
both in Southern and Northern Europe (i.e., Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Denmark). The bulk of them were 
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Figure 3. Growth in the stocks of TCNs and non-national EU–citizens in EU Member 






























Sources: SOPEMI (2002), Eurostat New Cronos database (2001). 
 
 
With this caveat in mind, there is little doubt that migration has been on the rise in the 
European Union in the 1990s. This is true for both TCNs and EU citizens. However, while 
the proportion of TCNs in the EU has increased by 33% over the decade, the proportion of 
EU citizens living in another EU country has grown by a less spectacular 10%. More 
precisely, foreign population has risen from 14,976,000 in 1990 to 18,915,000 in 2000 and 
the number of EU–foreign residents has gone from 5,502,000 to 6,014,000 (table 1). As 
they are based on citizenship and not on country of birth, these figures exclude holders of 
dual citizenship (forbidden in some EU countries) and naturalized migrants. But as has been 
aptly noted, ‘citizens of EU countries usually have little to gain from adopting the 
citizenship of another Member State. This is why the number of such acquisitions is limited’ 
(Eurostat 2004: 2). In the whole EU (Ireland excluded), in 2000 only 22,800 EU citizens 
acquired the citizenship of another Member State. This corresponds to 4.1% of all 
naturalizations and 0.3% of all intra–EU migrants (ibidem: 4–5)9.  
                                              
9 Of course, naturalization did give some advantage before the introduction of EU citizenship, so that the 
proportion of pre–Maastricht intra–EU migrants who have been absorbed among nationals of the host 
country may be significant. For instance, Maas (2004: 16–17) shows that naturalizations of EU foreigners in 
France in 1986 were twice and a half more numerous than in 1996.  
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Table 1. Stocks of foreign and non–national EU citizens in EU–15 countries, 1990–2000 
(thousands) 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
B 904,5 922,5 909,3 920,6 922,3 909,8 911,9 903,2 892,0 897,1 861,7
  555,6 559,3 541,6 548,5 552,3 554,5 559,6 562,0 562,5 563,6 – 
DK 160,6 169,5 180,1 189,0 196,7 222,7 237,7 249,6 256,3 259,4 258,6
  38,4 39,2 40,5 42,4 44,6 46,5 48,9 51,2 53,2 53,8 54,3
D 5342,5 5882,3 6495,8 6878,1 6990,5 7173,9 7314,0 7365,8 7319,5 7343,6 7296,8
  1644,8 1698,8       – 1750,2 1779,9 1811,7 1839,9 1850,0 1854,3 1858,7 1872,7
EL 229,1 253,3 262,3 149,1 152,8 155,5 161,1 165,7 – – – 
  59,1 61,6 64,7 42,9 43,7 44,4 45,0 44,1 – – – 
E 278,7 360,7 393,1 430,4 461,4 499,8 539,0 609,8 719,6 801,3 895,7
  255,8 289,8 181,8 200,5 219,8 235,6 251,9 260,6 295,3 312,2 375,5
F  3596,6 – – – – – – – – 3263,1 – 
  1311,9 – – – – – – – – 1195,5 – 
IRL 80,0 87,7 94,9 89,9 91,1 96,1 118,0 114,4 111,0 117,8 126,5
        – – 73,0 67,0 70,7 73,4 86,8 81,3 85,3 85,0 92,2
I 781,1 863,0 925,2 987,4 922,7 991,4 1095,6 1240,7 1250,2 1252,0 1338,2
  163,9 160,7 160,8 120,3 124,9 128,5 133,5   –   – 148,5 153,8
L 113,1 117,8 122,7 127,6 132,5 138,1 142,8 147,7 152,9 159,4 164,7
        – – – – – – 127,8 131,4   –   –  – 
NL 692,4 732,9 757,4 779,8 757,1 725,4 679,9 678,1 662,4 651,5 667,8
  174,0 181,9 188,7 193,9 193,1 191,1 188,3 190,2 192,2 195,9 201,6
A 456,1 532,7 623,0 689,6 713,5 723,5 728,2 732,7 737,3 748,2 757,9
        – 79,4    –  –   –    –     –   –    –      – 219,8
P 107,8 114,0 123,6 131,6 157,1 168,3 172,9 175,3 177,8 190,9 208,2
  29,9   –   – 32,7 36,2    – 41,5 43,7 48,2 52,4 56,8
FIN 26,3 37,6 46,3 55,6 62,0 68,6 73,8 80,6 85,1 87,7 91,1
  11,4 11,9 12,2 12,5 12,9 13,7 14,1 14,9 15,7 16,3 16,7
S 483,7 493,8 499,1 507,5 537,4 531,8 526,6 522,0 499,9 487,2 477,3
  195,7 190,5 186,3 182,6 180,3 179 178,2 176,8 177 177,4 180,1
UK 1723,0 1750,0 1985,0 2001,0 2032,0 1948,0 1934,0 2066,0 2207,0 2208,0 2342,0
  781,0 818,0  – 812,0   – 818,0 805,0 877,7 859,1 856,2 – 
Total 
foreigners  14975,5    15551,4    16249,7       18915,3 
Total  
non–national 
EU–citizens    5501,7    4832,6      5735,8         6014,3 
 
Source: SOPEMI (2002); Eurostat New Cronos database (2001) 
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The highest growth rate of TCNs took place at the beginning of the decade, when in fact the 
number of EU–foreigners stagnated. After 1993, however, the curves of increase of the two 
categories of immigrants show comparable upward tendencies (figure 3). By the turn of the 
century, intra–EU migrants represent 31% of the total population of non–nationals legally 
residing in EU Member States. This proportion varies greatly from one country to another. 
Only in Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland are intra–EU immigrants a majority among non–
national residents. In spite of restrictive migration policies for TCNs (cf. Geddes 2003), in 
all other EU Member States the bulk of foreign residents come from outside the European 
Union10. In the 1990s the number of EU immigrants has grown all over Europe – exceptions 
being Greece, France, Sweden, and Italy. This increase has been spectacular in Austria 
(their number has almost tripled) and Portugal (their number has almost doubled). In 
Finland, Spain, and Denmark there are about 50% more EU immigrants in 2000 than there 
were in 1990, while in Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the increase has 
been smaller. Generally speaking, the rising trend is quite stable, save for Greece, which 
experienced some growth in the 1990–1992 period, followed by a downturn in 1993, and 
some stabilization afterwards.  
 
The total amount of European migrants in EU Member States is still significantly impacted 
by the national communities that settled abroad during the post–World War II period of 
industrial recovery and mass migration along the South–North axis of the continent (table 
2). In the host countries of traditional immigration, more recent free movers have not altered 
the pre–existing picture. France is still the second largest Portuguese–speaking and 
Spanish–speaking country in the EU (64.3% of Portuguese and 37% of Spanish immigrants 
in the EU live there), as Germany is second home to the Greeks (82.5% of those who live 
outside Greece in Europe) and the Italians abroad (51.5%). In absolute figures, Italians in 
Germany form the single largest community of EU non–nationals in a EU Member State 
(619,000 persons). Another factor to reckon with is the ‘neighbor effect’: because of 
historical links, language homogeneity, or simply territorial proximity, some nationalities 
are strongly overrepresented among migrants in countries across their borders. This is the 
case for the Irish in the UK (91.5% of Irish immigrants in the EU are in Britain), but less so 
for Britons (14.9% of those who reside in another EU country are in Ireland, where they 
represent 75.3% of non–national EU citizens). Finns account for 54.7% of EU foreigners in 
Sweden, and Swedes for 47.4% of EU foreigners in Finland. Although in lower proportions, 
similar two–way migrations can be found between Germany and Austria, the Benelux 
countries (among themselves and with Germany), Germany and France (25.6% of the 
French EU migrants are in Germany, 18.8% of the Germans are in France) and Spain and 
Portugal (but in lower numbers). Finally, there are growing communities of Northern 
Europeans living in the Southern countries of the continent. The bulk of them moved at a 
relatively late age in search of more favorable weather and leisure conditions. German 
‘retirement migrants’ have mostly settled in Spain, where they amount to 23.6% of non–
Spanish EU citizens, and Italy (24.8% of non–Italian EU citizens), whereas Britons have an 
equally sizeable presence in Greece (30.4% of EU immigrants), Spain (26.4%) and Portugal 
(24.8%). Retirement migration seems to be a soaring trend currently boosting internal 
migration in the EU (King, Warnes and Williams 2000).  
                                              
10 Labor immigration and family reunification of TCNs make for a larger share of the immigrant population 
in those countries where the stocks of immigrants are higher: Germany (74% of foreign residents are not EU 
citizens), France (63%), the United Kingdom (61%), and Italy (almost 90%). 





Overall, 51.9% of intra–EU migrants are men and 48.1% are women in 2001. About half the 
15 EU Member States have a majority of male EU immigrants, and the other half a majority 
of female immigrants. At the extremes are Finland (63.7% of men) and Italy (58.1% of 
women). In particular, men prevail in all EU national communities settled in Finland. With 
the sole exception of the UK, all countries of older immigration (i.e., Central and Northern 
European countries) host a majority of male non–national EU citizens. The reverse is true 
for Southern European countries (except Portugal), where women from other EU Member 
States are in larger numbers. Possibly, this can reflect migration for intermarriage being 
more common than migration for work, since usually residence choices depend on 
breadwinner’s residence (and traditionally husbands are more often breadwinners residing 
in their home country). In terms of ‘national’ orientations by gender, it can be noted that 
Greek migrants are disproportionately men in all EU countries (being 86% of the Greeks in 
Finland and 76% of the Greeks in Denmark), whereas Finnish women are a majority among 
Finns living in all other EU Member States (being 84% and 76% of their nationals residing 
in Greece and Italy). Like Finns, also Swedish and Danish women outnumber their male co–
nationals in every EU Member State but Portugal and Finland. 
Table 2. Stocks of non–national EU citizens in EU Member States by nationality, 2001 
Country of residence 
 
B DK D  EL E F IRL  I L NL P FIN  S UK Total 
B 520 23,494 1,183 18,272 66,666 5,208 13,200 25,860 2,115 116 629 8,230  165,493 
DK 3,240  20,963 1,238 6,173 4,500 2,237 2,000 2,588 767 580 25,567 16,739  86,592 
D 34,321 12,701 9,369 88,651 78,381 38,183 10,020 54,811 10,374 2,201 16,357 62,087  417,456 
EL 18,386 660 365,438 866 5,768 13,538 1,250 5,692 143 312 4,407 26,307  442,767 
E  45,917  1,802 129,471 670 161,762 14,867 2,910 17,155 12,189 533 3,320 46,560  437,156 
F 107,240  3,296 110,173 5,094 46,376 29,713 16,530 13,326 7,186 859 4,709 85,592  430,094 
IRL 3,295  1,094 15,690 495 3,413 5,314 2,204 930 3,990 446 218 1,146 411,834  450,069 
I  200,281  2,833 619,060 5,493 27,874 201,670  19,890 18,248 3,031 774 4,512 97,230 1,200,896 
L 4,353 18 5,981 40 354 3,640 257 312 85 11 26 544  15,621 
NL 85,763  4,531 110,786 2,701 21,763 24,745 7,312 3,810 4,073 623 3,801 28,822  298,730 
A 2,072 746 187,742 1,424 4,088 4,139 6,256 500 3,366 542 217 2,767 5,958  219,817 
P  25,560 555 133,726 241 43,340 553,663 4,639 54,490 9,765 118 1,317 33,859  861,273 
FIN 2,688  2,085 15,903 954 5,420 2,748 1,579 620 1,980 506 98,571 11,950  145,004 
S 4,284 10,839 18,875 1,812 9,879 7,252 3,240 860 3,077 1,232 7,887 20,445  89,682 
UK 26,156 12,630 115,353 13,394 99,017 75,250 77,320 24,592 4,400 41,404 14,094 2,207 13,062   518,879 
Non national  
EU citizens 563,556 54,310  1,872,655 44,108 375,486 1,195,498 102,655 153,825 131,410 201,574 56,783 16,656 180,191 856,156  
 
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos database (2001) 
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As is well known, ‘traditional’ migrations tend to follow established tracks especially 
because of network effects. Faced with the uncertainties of life in alien environments, 
migrants concentrate where nationals (and possibly families or friends) have already settled. 
Is this true also of intra–EU migrants? While micro–level studies are certainly needed to 
answer this question in greater details, Lieberson’s (1969) index of diversity can be applied 
to the distribution of each nationality of EU–migrants among EU Member States to measure 
how much these people scatter around Europe. In short, the index reveals that intra–EU 
movers do not spread around at random. As we have already seen, some of them are indeed 
channeled to typical destinations. This is the case for the Irish, who disproportionately move 
to Great Britain, the Austrians, who tend to migrate to Germany, and the Greeks, who also 
are more likely to move to Germany than anywhere else. Greater variability is shown by 
British, German and Swedish migrants. Generally speaking, it seems that more recent waves 
of migration (such as those from the latter countries) have more diverse destinations than 
traditional intra–EU migrations dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, 
Lieberson’s index can also be used to measure the degree of diversity of EU migrants within 
each Member State. Most EU countries show a quite high mixité of their immigrant 
population from Western Europe. The lowest level of diversity is shown by Sweden, due to 
the overwhelming presence of citizens from other Nordic countries – an effect of cultural 
proximity but also of legal facilitation for mobility across Scandinavian states since 1954.  
 
 






Per country of 
residence  
DK .81 .80 
D .86 .83 
EL .31 .82 
E .75 .83 
F .81 .73 
IRL .16 – 
I .67 .85 
L .72 .77 
NL .76 .84 
A .27 – 
P  .55 .83 
FIN .52 .73 
S .86 .66 
UK .88 .73 
 
Source: Author’s re–elaboration from Eurostat, New Cronos database (2001) 
 
 
Overall, in the wake of the 21st century, four main intra–EU migration patterns can be 
outlined: 
a) Traditional South–North migration. While current EU movers do not fit in the 
post–World War II migrants’ portrait (male, young, illiterate, from rural areas) any longer, 
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the diversification of migration projects and trajectories has not entirely offset the traditional 
model. Still in 2004, at least two different bus companies operate a weekly service between 
Sicily and Germany, catering for a larger public than old migrants visiting their home 
country, witness the rise in the number of Italian residents in Germany – 10% between 1994 
and 2001 (Recchi et al. 2003: 30). Another clue to the persistence of these flows comes 
from employment data: in 2000 there were 16,225 Italians among construction workers in 
Germany (about 15% of the total), in an employment sector which normally absorbs 
immigrant workers in the early stages of their migration experience (Dobson and Salt 2002: 
24). Work opportunities in the building and tourism industry of the richest Northern EU 
countries continue to be sought after by a sizeable proportion of the migrant population 
from Southern Europe.  
b) Cross–border migration. Research on cross–border commuting in different 
areas of the EU found considerable variation in the propensity of Europeans physically 
located at a short distance from other Member States to take advantage of free movement 
rights (Clasen 2003). However, this form of migration does not hinge on geographical 
proximity alone, as cultural and linguistic closeness between countries does facilitate 
migration flows. EU citizens moving from and to Benelux, Scandinavia, Ireland and Britain, 
Germany and Austria benefit from lower barriers for social integration in the host country. 
Moreover, cross–border migration is likely to increase, as mobility to Austria and Germany 
was already very popular among Eastern Europeans before the 2004 enlargement that 
extended to them the right to move within the EU without a visa (Wallace 2002; William 
and Baláž 2002)11.  
c) Retirement and resort migration. As anticipated, by the end of the 20th century 
flows of North–to–South migrants have contributed to the rise of international migration in 
Western Europe. Recent research on a Spanish coastal area shows that pensioners activate 
some network effects on their friends and relatives, expanding and diversifying the scope of 
these flows (Alaminos, Santacreu and Albert 2003). Perhaps, thus, retirement associates to 
resort migration, taking account of the growing number of people who buy or rent a second 
home and live intermittently in another EU country (usually in Southern Europe, but also in 
global cities, art towns and resorts elsewhere in the EU). The boundaries between the two 
forms of migration are indeed blurred. What they probably share is subjective identification: 
retirement and resort movers are likely to restrain from calling themselves ‘migrants’, but 
neither would they accept to be classified as ‘tourists’. 
d) Student migration. Erasmus (in 1995 renamed Socrates), an EU–funded 
program launched in 1989 to encourage student mobility between universities in the 
European Union, looks like the single most successful EU activity to spread Europeanness 
in everyday life12. In the late 1990s participation in the program was extended to citizens of 
candidate countries; Icelandic, Norwegian, and Liechtensteinian citizens were entitled to 
                                              
11 Citizens of the states who joined the EU in 2004 (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta) are free to travel and live in any other Member State, and 
also to deliver services abroad as company–holders or self–employed. Yet they cannot take up employment 
in those States that did not adopt an open labor market policy explicitly. This transition arrangement, which 
replicates the limits to free movement set by previous enlargements, will terminate in 2011 at the latest. As 
an exception, citizens of Cyprus and Malta were granted full mobility rights all over the European Union 
immediately in 2004.  
12 While Erasmus–Socrates targets higher education, other smaller programs promote mobility for 
internships (Leonardo program), language teaching and learning (Lingua program), voluntary work (Youth 
for Europe program), and adult education (Grundtvig program). 




apply from the start; Turkey joined in 2004. The program has widened its scope 
enormously: from 3,200 participants in 1987 to 124,000 fifteen years later. In 2002 the 
symbolic threshold of one million participants was trespassed. High as they can seem, these 
numbers lag behind the European Commission’s goal of involving 10% of all students in 
institutions of higher education13. Since duration of stay abroad can last from three to no 
more than twelve months, and registration rules vary from country to country, the incidence 
of Erasmus students among officially resident intra–EU migrants is hard to assess. For sure, 
however, it contributes to keep the average age of European movers low. On the basis of 
national statistics, Eurostat estimates that among EU nationals moving between Member 
States ‘37.5% of men and 43.5% of women were in their 20s’ in the 1995–1999 period’ 
(Thorogood and Winqvist 2003: 3).  
 
5. Free Movement for What?  
Pleading for Research on Intra–EU Migration  
Free movement within the EU is part and parcel of the European integration project from its 
inception. From an economic viewpoint, it represents the labor market counterpart to 
monetary union. High labor mobility is required in an optimally functioning single currency 
area to absorb local economic shocks due to the decline of some country–based production 
system. This argument won Robert Mundell, who first formulated it in a widely cited article 
(Mundell 1961), the Nobel prize for economics in 1999 and represents the theoretical 
justification for the support to free movement of market–oriented policymakers. From a 
political viewpoint, on the other hand, free movement is cherished by EU institutions as an 
instrument to deepen European integration at the societal level. As has been observed, ‘the 
Union has not been totally “agnostic” with respect to the Good. It tends to favour the way of 
life of mobile, well resourced and well educated Europeans who have participated in 
Erasmus exchange programmes and developed a cosmopolitan outlook’ (Kostakopolou 
2001: 89). The rationale for this, as affirmed for instance in the Action Plan for Mobility 
(European Commission 2002), is that those who do taste free movement rights are led to 
appreciate EU citizenship and endorse European unification more vigorously. In addition, 
there is the expectation that movers may contribute to play down national differences, 
fulfilling the vision of Euro–enthusiastic intellectuals like Vaclav Havel: ‘if regulations on 
the movements of citizens disappear, we will see the sort of blending produced in the 
Austro–Hungarian Monarchy before the First World War. Subjects came and went, married 
all over the place, tried their luck at many things, without any of the preceding impeding 
development of national cultures’ (Havel 1998: 119)14. In this scenario, the fusion of 
European societies would be greatly facilitated by an increased territorial mobility. 
 
 
                                              
13 Spain and France are the most popular destinations, while the UK has the greatest net immigration of EU 
moving students. All figures are taken from the official EU Erasmus–Socrates website 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/programmes/socrates).  
14 From the viewpoint of sociological theory, this is not a trivial hypothesis. It implies that migratory 
experiences bring about collective identities on the basis of acculturation and contacts occurring in the 
everyday life of another European country. In other words, it assumes that practices influence values more 
than the other way around – that is, the reverse of socialization theories.  
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Yet, migration flows of European citizens do not seem to match economists’ and Euro–
enthusiasts’ aspirations. As an EC top officer bitterly admits, in the EU ‘people do not seek 
to migrate unless there are compelling reasons. Frequently, in both Member States and 
candidate countries, jobs in one part of a country fail to attract people from other parts; how 
much less is the attraction then in a wholly different linguistic and social environment?’ 
(Glaser 2001: 33). Europeans’ alleged reluctance to move can be imputed to a variety of 
reasons. Candidate explanations are the ongoing reduction of cross–country differences in 
salaries due to economic convergence (although minimum wages still range from €416 in 
Portugal to €1369 in Luxembourg [Clare and Paternoster 2003: 2])15, the deep–seated 
persistence of national identities and life habits, and geographical stability as a typically 
European value associated with well–being and affluence (Pastore 2004: 76).  
 
But are we really sure that Europeans are so immobile? Statements like Glaser’s quoted 
above are quite common in both political and academic discourse. They assume a spatial 
yardstick for comparison: internal migration in the EU is low vis–à–vis its US counterpart. 
Annual cross–EU mobility flows – 0.1% of the resident population – is compared to the 
cross–state mobility flow of the US, which amounts to 3.1% (e.g., European Commission 
2002: 29; Piracha and Vickerman 2003: 5; for US data, Schachter 2001: 1). The correctness 
of this exercise seems questionable on many grounds. The United States is a federal State, 
whereas the European Union is not; the USA is a nation, the EU not; free movement in the 
USA is a century–old phenomenon, being only a very recent possibility in the EU. Perhaps, 
when assessing the success of intra–EU migration, a temporal yardstick is more appropriate. 
In this perspective, as shown before (figure 3), it must be acknowledged that the number of 
moving EU citizens is in fact on the rise by the end of the 20th century.  
 
But this is not all. There is room to believe that the real size of the phenomenon is not 
entirely taken into account by existing statistics. Western Europeans are likely to be more 
mobile than represented in censuses and other public records. The point is that their 
mobility is becoming too volatile for the statistical eye. Paradoxically, it is the very 
legislation on free movement that engenders elusive migrations. EU citizens can relocate for 
temporary or intermittent stays without any stringent necessity to register abroad. The 
emerging pattern of Europeans’ mobility projects is likely to be ‘bite–and–go migration’. 
Some city areas (Paris, London, Berlin, Brussels, and Barcelona) take the lion’s share of 
these movements as they enjoy inherent and persistent appeal, also because of their higher 
permeability in terms of access to temporary housing, employment arrangements, 
commercial niches, and specialized leisure tastes. If economic considerations contribute to 
shape individual migration projects, they obey more subtle logics than the kind of 
disequilibria that explain traditional migration flows in economists’ view (e.g., the 
accumulation of different forms of cultural capital at lower costs than in home countries). 
Indeed, recent analyses indicate that changes in the economic outlook of EU–15 Member 
States do not affect population movements between them significantly (Mouhoud and 
Oudinet 2004). Intra–EU migrations are largely due to inertia. Year after year, movements 
in and out of each country repeat themselves with marginal variations regardless of 
variations in wage and unemployment differentials. But what is more, emigration and 
                                              
15 Existing studies on the effects of wage and unemployment differentials on workforce mobility within the 
EU show that intra–communitarian migration flows have a relatively low elasticity to changes in these two 
economic factors, in particular when compared to US states (for a review, see Ederveen and Bardsley 2003).  




immigration in EU countries are highly correlated – that is, destinations with higher inflows 
have higher outflows as well (ibidem: 90). This is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
emerging form of migration across the EU has a short–term and circulatory character. 
Guests come to stay was the brilliant title of a study on post–World War II migration in 
Europe (Rogers 1985). ‘Guests come to stay and go’ could be its new version capturing 
intra–EU movements in the early 21st century.  
 
Although we may speculate that this model of territorial mobility has some 
overrepresentation in middle–upper classes with a nomadic and globalizing lifestyle, it 
would be highly misleading to classify it as ‘elite migration’. In fact, the opportunity to 
move around the EU without too many formalities is appealing also to lower–middle class 
individuals as a shortcut to capital accumulation – be it economic or cultural capital, or a 
mix of the two. An example is the myriads of young Europeans temporarily employed in the 
tourism business in London, trying to make some pocket money and improve their English 
at the same time. Among more stable workers, there are certainly the ‘golden migrations’ of 
expat managers (Wagner 1999), but also the tiresome and lonesome commuting experiences 
of sales agents and technicians (Tarrius 1992 and 2000). They have little in common, except 
for the (still quite unusual) practice of mobility, which seems to be a growing criterion of 
social distinction in Western societies (Bauman 1998). Should their number expand, we 
may even expect the rise of a new politico–identitarian cleavage based on multicultural 
practices for ‘movers’ vs. monocultural frameworks prevailing among ‘stayers’. In a sense, 
this outcome would reproduce the ‘local–cosmopolitan’ divide – a dichotomy of reference 
group orientations dear to classic sociologists and unjustly forgotten (Merton 1957: 368 ff.; 
Gouldner 1957 and 1958).  
 
Of course, this is nothing more than conjecture, as we have very limited knowledge of this 
heterogeneous population. In fact, further investigation of it seems promising in several 
directions. Intra–EU migrants sit on the cutting edge of social change in Europe. They 
straddle at least two issues that are on top of the agenda of European studies: the integration 
of European societies and the emergence of a European collective identity.  
 
On the one hand, scholars focusing on the convergence of national societies in the EU are 
invited to consider that perhaps no other research target offers the opportunity to grapple 
with ‘Europeanization from below’ as much as they do. Their micro–social integration can 
be taken as a significant indicator of the state of macro–social processes of integration of 
EU societies. These people are practitioners of comparative sociological analysis on the 
European scale (at least on a two–case level, but often on more). Since Montesquieu’s 
Lettres persanes, transnational migrants provide the Litmus test of societal difference. 
Societies are different inasmuch as social actors moving across them perceive them as 
different. In this light, research should focus on the integration of intra–EU migrants in host 
countries, along the lines set out by Favell (2001 and 2004). In his study on free moving EU 
citizens in London, Brussels and Amsterdam, Favell (2004: 2) highlights ‘the array of 
informal barriers and struggles they encounter in forging ordinary middle class lives in a 
foreign environment – in terms of housing, child care and education, political participation, 
medical and welfare benefits, and long term financial planning – [discovering] sedimented 
regional and national cultures that sustain domestic middle class privileges in intensely 
competitive urban environments’. In this research framework, a relevant question to address 
is whether intra–EU destinations are chosen because of their imagined cultural proximity or, 
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rather, represent fungible worldwide locations on the basis of changing opportunities. 
Should the latter be the case, European free movers would fit into Sklair’s (2001) 
‘transnational capitalist class’ driven by global market imperatives, irrespectively of 
political citizenship and historic–cultural processes of supranational integration. 
 
The second perspective is equally worth exploring. Intra–EU migrants can be studied 
profitably by research on European identity. Assuming a constructivist view by which a 
stronger attachment to Europe emerges out of denser networks of communications and 
interactions, who else more than internal migrants can nurture some identification with 
Europe? Intra–EU migrants exploit the opportunities of a wider labor market, or at least, if 
they are not workers, that of crossing State frontiers (something they do presumably more 
often than ‘ordinary’ EU citizens) without border controls, registration duties, and concerns 
about currency exchange. European integration seems to be in the best interest of many of 
them, just like the creation of a new nation (and its political–administrative bureaucracy) 
used to be for the cultivated young in Gellner’s imaginary and prototypical Ruritania 
(Gellner 1983: ch. 5). One can even speculate that internal migrants might act as vehicles of 
cultural unification and legitimization of the polity that contains and allows their 
movements (be it the Austro–Hungarian Empire, the United States, or the EU)16. In sum, 
there are good reasons to expect intra–EU migrants to be heralds of Europeanness. 
However, empirical evidence supporting this argument is modest so far. Apart from small–
scale studies of a highly specific work environment (Zabuski 2000) and of university 
students involved in university exchange programs (King and Ruiz–Gelices 2003), on the 
issue there is definitely a research void. We simply don’t know if intra–EU migrants are 
more highly Europeanized and pro–EU than other European citizens. This lacuna can be 
filled only by taking a bottom–up approach to the study of the relation between intra–EU 
migration and identification with Europe – that is, by listening to the voices of the human 
beings who concretely and personally experience what it means to move and settle in a 








                                              
16 On the basis of Eurobarometer data, Recchi and Nebe (2003) tested the hypothesis of a ‘halo effect’ of 
intra–EU migrants on support for the EU in their host countries. This did not seem to be the case with the 
exception of Luxembourg, the EU Member State with the highest proportion of residents from the rest of the 
Union (29.9%) and also the highest levels of support for European institutions and European integration 
(20% of respondents to Eurobarometer in 1999 described themselves as ‘European’ without reference to any 
nationality [European Commission 2001: 10–11]). 
17 This is precisely the primary objective of a research project – the PIONEUR project – that a multinational 
team is currently undertaking. The PIONEUR project is coordinated by the author of this paper at CIUSPO, 
Università di Firenze. Research partner institutions are ZUMA, Mannheim (coordinator: Michael Braun), 
CEVIPOF, Paris (coordinator: Anne Muxel), CSLS, Oxford University (coordinator: Damian Tambini), 
OBETS, Universidad de Alicante (coordinator: Antonio Alaminos). PIONEUR is funded by the European 
Commission (5th Framework Program). For more detailed information, see the project web site: 
http://www.obets.ua.es/pioneur/. 
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